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I.~.
IN late January, the Administration announced its
economic strategy for 1976 and future years. An
enunciation of macroeconomic goals along with a pro-
posed course of policy actions to achieve them is
found in three documents — the Federal Budget
for Fiscal Year 1977, the Economic Report of the
President, and the Annual Report of the Council of
Economic Advisers. These three documents present
(1) Federal budget plans for the remainder of the
current fiscal year and the upcoming fiscal year which
begins October 1, 1976, (2) economic forecasts for
calendar 1976 and 1977, and (3) a set of economic
and budget projections through 1981 which place the
more immediate forecasts and policy proposals in a
longer-run framework of economic objectives.
The shift of emphasis in macroeconomic analysis
and policy to a long-mn horizon of six years represents
primarily a response to the provisions of the Congres-
sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
According to that Act, the beginning of the fiscal year
was changed from July 1 to October 1, but more im-
portantly, this Act required the Administration to
make budget projections for a longer-mn period than
previously,1 These budget projections are conditioned
by the assumptions that are made about the course of
economic activity. It is necessary, therefore, that the
Administration’s short-run forecasts and policy pro-
posals be consistent with the long-run projections.
With an eye toward long-run economic targets, the
Administration has forecast GNP growth of 12.3 per-
cent in 1976, which is distributed as a 6.3 percent
increase in real product and a 5.9 percent advance in
prices. By comparison, GNP rose 8.5 percent in 1975,
with real product declining 2 percent and prices rising
8.7 percent. Unemployment is projected to average
7.7 percent of the labor force in 1976, compared to an
average of 8.5 percent in 1975.2
t
Long-run projections were presented in last year’s budget as
a dry run, but fiscal 1977 is the first year that they are
required under law.
2Eniployment developments since late January suggest that
the economic expansion may be moving ahead of schedule.
Unemployment in March was 7.5 percent of the labor force.
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As a means of implementing the overall economic
program, a budget plan is outlined with emphasis on
the upcoming fiscal year 1977. As a part of that plan,
Federal expenditures (national income accounts
basis) are projected to rise 9.4 percent in calendar
1976 and 5.3 percent in 1977. Included among the
budget proposals are a number of tax changes which
require Congressional action, in addition to those
scheduled under existing law. Scheduled and pro-
posed tax changes include: (1) a reduction in tax
rates on individual and corporate income on July 1,
1976, and (2) an increase in social security and un-
employment trust fund taxes on January 1, l977.~
The emphasis of the Administration’s program is on
the Federal budget, yet the CEA Report discusses at
some length a course of monetary policy considered
consistent with their overall economic program. For
the immediate future, the Administration seems con-
tent with a monetary policy that stays near the mid-
point of the Federal Reserve’s then announced target
range of 5 to 7½percent growth (from third quarter
1975 to third quarter 1976) in the money stock (M1 ) .‘~
What seems as important from the viewpoint of the
Administration as the specific rate of increase of
money is the extent of fluctuation about the target
growth rate. The CEA makes a case for steadiness in
monetary and fiscal policy as a means of promoting a
sustainable recovery.5
The primary purpose of this article is to summarize
and evaluate the economic program as presented in
the 1976 Economic Report and the Fiscal 1977
Budget. The focus of the discussion is on the nature of
the program as it relates to the achievement of full-
employment with relative price stability. Many non-
stabilization issues are also included in the economic
program of the Administration, but they are not dis-
cussed here.
more complete listinp of proposed tax changes is found
in the section entitled ‘Proposals and Guidelines for Macro-
economic Policy,”
~The target range for M
1
has subsequently been widened to
4½to 7½ percent for the year ending fourth quarter 1976.
~1976 CEA Report, pp. 20-21.
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A secondary purpose is to review the CEA’s 1975
economic projections in light of the actual course of
the economy last year. This review shows where and
why the CEA projections went awry. The accuracy of
past projections provides some basis for judging how
accurate their most recent projections are likely to be.
RE%TE%V
A year ago, when the CEA presented its forecast
for calendar 1975, the economy was in the midst of a
severe recession, with unemployment rising, output
declining sharply, and the deficit in the Federal
budget increasing. Furthermore, energy considerations
were creating considerable uncertainty with regard to
prospective economic conditions. Actually the reces-
sion had begun in late 1973, and the economy was
showing signs of recovery during 1974, but then out-
put was jolted downward again in late 1974. The
CEA’s forecast for 1975, which was very much in line
with the consensus at that lime, was a realistic one
in the sense that it did not project a rosy picture for
unemployment and prices.
Against the backdrop of recession and continuing
inflation, the Administration presented a very ambi-
tious program of fiscal action, This program consisted
of a proposed 15.5 percent increase in expenditures
and a number of tax changes which added up to a net
tax cut of about $20 billion. The Administration also
recommended that monetary policy provide “growth
in money and credit ... which .. ,will encourage a
freer flow of credit and lower interest rates...”~
/ U 1/ 1) eGoso /‘Oss)05..
The 1975 CEA Report forecast an increase in GNP
of 7.3 percent for the year. Preliminary data indicate
that GNP actually rose 6.5 percent. Even though
GNP growth was overestimated, the forecast was well
within the range of error based on past CEA experi-
ence (see Table I) .~ More significantly the contours
of the economic recovery in 1975 were accurately
forecast by the CEA, with a recovery beginning be-
fore midyear. In fact, the recovery appears to have
begun in April or May.
Table I




1962 9.4% 6.7% 2.7%
1963 4.4 54 1.0
1964 6.5 6.6 0.1
1965 6.1 7.5 1.4
1966 6.9 86 1.7
1967 6.4 56 08
1968 7.8 9.0 1.2
1969 7.0 7.7 0.7
1970 5.7 4.9 0.8
1971 9.0 7.5 1.5
1972 9.4 9.7 0.3
1973 10.0 11.5 15
1974 7.9 79 0.0
1975 7.3 6.5 0.8
Ave’age Absolute E’roi 1.0%
‘1’,’’’ ui,, ‘in ci ci. (IC~ /:,..u,,.’: ci:, ,‘~‘
~ 1’,.. ,
1
...,n..,..’ : ‘ ‘‘.
.. ,,. “‘‘n’:,
Despite the fact that the CEA’s GNP forecast was
reasonably accurate, an analysis of the components of
GNP indicates that the relative success of the forecast
received a major boost from an offsetting error for one
item — net exports (see Table II). The CEA over-
estimated the increase in GNP by $9 billion, but if
they had not underestimated net exports, the forecast
error for CNP would have been $25 billion. The fore-
cast was made credible because domestic demand for
6J975 CEA Report, p. 26.
~Planned and actual figures in Tables - IV are not strictly
comparable because of the extensive revisions of the national
income accounts in early 1976.
Demand and Production
Q,~,,i,,lyT,t,l,
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Table II
PROJECTED AND ACTUAL CHANGES NJ GNP
AND COMPONENTS: 1974 TO 1975
I Billion, a’ Dallo’sl
rEA
P’aj ec,ion - ActLal ‘ Error
Pe,sanal ~ansun’pOa,i 585 1 577.3 S 7.8
Lnnes. Fixed lnvcitment 6.0 8 5.2
~har.ge in lrventores 18.3 23.9 5.6
Res,dent,al Construction 2 3 5.8 3.5
Federal PLrchoses 9.9 11.4 1.5
State & Loca P’jrcnases 23.1 18 4 4 7
Net Exports 2.3 13.8 96. i
GNP 510’ 3 $92 1 S 9 2
i:—.. ,~ t.~ ii:. 19..,iI, ~ . : ‘‘‘7’ I..’ 3.’ n.e
.7.. 5. l.’’,),’,,,.,t.
imports was overestimated resulting in an underesti-
mation of net exports. Imports declined sharply while
exports rose slightly.
Examination of the 1975 GNP forecast in terms of
its distribution between output and prices reveals
another set of offsetting errors (see Table III). The
decline in output was actually overestimated with
output decreasing 2 percent compared to a forecast
decline of 3.3 percent. Similarly, on the inflation side
the CEA was also overly pessimistic, projecting an
advance of prices of 10.8 percent; prices actually rose
8.7 percent. It should be pointed out, however, that
the CEA inflation forecast included projected effects
of higher excise taxes on energy products; these pro-
posed excise tax changes were not legislated by
Congress.8
Table Ill
PROJECTED AND ACTUAL CHANGES IN
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: 1974 TO 1975
cEA
Projection Actual !rrar
GNP 7.3% a.s% 0.8%
Output — 3.3 2.0 ---1.3
Prices 10.8 8.7 2.1
Unemployment Rate 8.1 8.5 - 0.4
StsrbUization Policy in 1975
A comparison of observed and forecast GNP is of
little meaning in and of itself. In fairness to any fore-
caster, it is necessary to evaluate the accuracy of the
8
lmport fees on crude oil and petroleum products were im-
posed by Administrative action in 1975, but this action was a
very small part of the total energy program that was proposed
originally.
assumptions that underlie the forecast. Of particular
importance for any macroeconomic forecast are as-
sumptions about monetary and fiscal variables. In the
case of the 1975 CEA forecast, the planned course of
fiscal actions was laid out in great detail, but there
was considerable ambiguity as to the prescribed plan
for monetary action,
Mooetanj I’olic~-~ The 1975 CEA report was
especially vague with regard to its recommendations
for monetary policy, and made only very general
recommendations:
Monetary policy must be conducted so as to en-
courage a near term recovery in the economy and a
resumption of sustainable economic growth. Toward
this end, reasonable growth in money and credit will
be required — growth, which, one hopes, will en-
courage a freer flow of credit and lower interest rates
in private credit markets.9
To assign meaning to this statement it is necessary
to recall that monetary growth in the last half of 1974
was slow relative to the trend of the previous 2½
~‘ears.Although the money stock data have since been
revised, at that time the Federal Reserve reported
that M1 had grown at only a 2.8 percent annual rate
in the second half of 1974. In early 1975, most ob-
servers translated the CEA call for “reasonable
growth” in money as an increase in M1 in the 6 to 8
percent range.1°
°1975 CEA Report, p. 26.
10
See the testimony of David Rowe and Franco Modigliani in
The 1975 Economic Report of the President, Hearings before
the Joint Economic Committee, Part 2 (Febmary 1975),
and Keith M. Carlson, “The 1975 National Economic Pro-
grain: Another Exercise in Fiscal Activism,” this Review
(March 1975), p. 10.
Money Stock
9969 969 970 979 9972 973
d,t,pk’, d: M,,d,
9974 9975 9976
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Recently revised money data indicate that M1 grew
4.4 percent from fourth quarter 1974 to fourth quarter
1975. By this measure, there is little question that
monetary actions were less stimulative than the CEA
was implicitly assuming in its forecast. Furthermore,
the path of monetary actions was an unsteady one;
money declined slightly in the first quarter, followed
by rapid growth in the second and third quarters,
and then finished the year with yen’ slow growth
again in the fourth quarter.11
In accordance with tradition, the
policy emphasis in the 1975 Report was on fiscal ac-
tions. The fiscal plan for calendar 1975 was a very
stimulative one, although the extent of net stimulus
was overstated if one looked at the projected change
in the NM deficit (see Table IV). The CEA forecast
of a large increase in the NIA deficit reflected partly
the expected effects of weak economic activity on tax
receipts and increased expenditures for unemploy-
inent compensation.
As a measure of fiscal plans, the high-employment
budget serves a useful function in helping to isolate
the active aspect of the fiscal policy process from the
passive response to economic activity. In early 1975,
the Administration was planning an increase of $40
billion in expenditures on a high-employment basis.
Dominating this planned increase were transfer pay-
1t
For a detailed summary of monetary developments in 1975,
see Nancy Jianakoplos, “The FOMC in 1975: Announcing
Monetary Targets,” this Review (March 1976), pp. 8-22.
lab t.
PLANNED AND ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE
FEDERAL BUDGET: 1974 TO 1975
S1,or, of Do- arn~
8,.dgol Pcn Actua: Era.
NA Rec..ipin S 8 .. S 4 9 5 3.5
MA Espe-,d.’.pr.’ 462 568 135
MA Ss.rpL.s a’ D~r,
5.
:c S 547 S 61.7 5 7.0
Hiyh-E’nployr-e.-t
Recots S 216 S 22/ $ 49
Hiqh.Ernplo., nfl-ri
Expcna.turc, 40 ‘ 49.5 9 4
Hiqh Ernplaynnert Ss.rphJs
onDr.ficI S 125 S 268 5 143
inents which included a one-time payment to social
security beneficiaries. The actual increase in Federal
spending ill 1975 exceeded projections, however, as
high-employment expenditures rose by over 849 bil-
lion, or 17 percent over 1974.
On the receipts side, Table IV indicates that high-
employment receipts increased less than planned in
197512 The chief reason for this was that the CEA’s
high inflation forecast was not realized, The growth of
high-employment receipts reflects not only changes in
tax rates but is also sensitive to changes in the rate of
inflation. Congress enacted tax cuts only slightly less
in magnitude than those proposed by the Administra-
tion in early 1975. The composition of these tax
changes, however, was substantially different from
that proposed.
As a result, with tax actions more stimulative than
planned (as measured by the change in high-employ-
ment receipts), and with expenditures rising faster
than anticipated, the net effect of fiscal actions in
1975 was more expansionary than planned. The high-
employment budget moved from a $14 billion surplus
in 1974 to a $13 billion deficit in 1975. This swing of
$27 billion was about $14 billion more than planned.
On the other hand, monetary actions were apparently
less stimulative than expected. Thus to the extent that
policy actions contributed to the overestimate of CNP
growth, it appears that monetary actions were pri-
snarily responsible. Such a conclusion is highly tenta-
tive, however, because the CEA does not give the
details of the economic framework that provides the
basis for their forecasts.
12
The problem of comparability requires emphasis here, be-
cause of the national income accounts revisions by the
Department of Commerce and revisions in the high-employ-
snent budget by this Bank.








The economic situation facing the CEA in early
1976 is very much different from what it was a year
earlier. The economy is in the midst of a recovery,
and the forces of inflation have moderated substan-
tially. Against this backdrop of economic improve-
snent, the CEA has forecast very strong economic
growth for both 1976 and 1977. The focus of discus-
sion in the CEA Report is on 1976; very few details
are given regarding the 1977 forecast.13
A summary of the components of the 1976 GNP
forecast reveals that the strength of economic activity
is expected to be broadly based (see Table ‘/). Both
personal consumption and business fixed investment
are projected to rise in the neighborhood of 11 per-
cent. Residential construction is forecast to advance
by almost 40 percent from a depressed level in 1975
and inventories are projected to swing from net liqui-
dation in 1975 to accumulation in 1976. Net exports
are expected to remain positive, hut not at the extra-
ordinarily high rate of 1975; this is mainly because
economic expansion in the U.S. is expected to increase
the demand for imports.
ThbIe ‘t
CHANGES IN GNP AND COMPONENTS-
1975 AND 1976
(Do far Amount or Bitinonsi




SInnptIon $ 773 87% $106.8 111%
& Sinless Fixed
Inves ment 8 0.5 163 11,0
Change on
tnventoñ*s 23 9 — 25 2
ResidentIal Con
slruction 5.8 10.6 182 373
Federal
Purchases 114 10.2 6.9 £6
State and Lacat
Purchases 184 9.7 172 83
Net Exports 13.8 — $ 5
GNP $ 921 6.5% $1850 12.3%
~asc&don prelimnrnarxdatam 1976 ~A R rt
“Etlnmtedb ths Ban and base,lon 178 EAkpart
Another facet of the 1976 forecast that stands in
marked contrast to the actual experience in 1975 is
the projected trend of govemment purchases of goods
and services. Growth of Federal purchases is planned
liThe 1977 forecast is found in The Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 1977, p. 25, and is not
discussed in the CEA Report.
to slow relative to 1975, and once allowance is made
for price increases, the 5.6 percent increase in nominal
terms translates into little or no change in real terms.
State and local purchases are also expected to in-
crease less rapidly than in 1975, although the slow-
down is less dramatic than for Federal spending.
Km nosuE; 17fl1
f3•Jucmous;~ c tu;ni.iuL’o~ic:
The Administration’s projection of considerable eco-
nomic strength raises questions about the policy as-
sumptions that underlie the forecasts. When viewed
in conjunction with the strong economic projections,
the Federal budget program becomes a matter of
substantial interest because it reflects a proposed
move toward less stimulus, at least according to con-
ventional definitions.
Lxnei~thwmmm— The budget program for
calendar 1976 calls for an increase in expenditures
(NIA basis) of $34 billion, or 9.4 percent (see Table
VI). This projected increase contrasts with the 19
percent increase in 1975. Projections for calendar 1977
indicate further slowing in Federal spending, to a 5.3
percent rate of increase. This pattern of slower growth
represents a conscious effort on the part of the Ad-
ministration to arrest the growth of Covernment and













Defense expenditures are projected to increase 5.2
percent in 1976 and 6.3 percent in 1977. These pro-
jected increases reflect planned purchases of sophis-
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ticated military equipment and, given the inflation
projections, would represent little change in real
terms.
The nondefense category of Federal spending is
planned to hear the brunt of Administration cutbacks.
After rising at a 15 percent average annual rate from
1969 to 1974, and accelerating to a 23 percent increase
in 1975, nondefense spending is being proposed to
increase by a more moderate 11 percent in 1976. The
projected rise for 1977 is 5 percent. Transfer pay-
onents are estimated to increase 9.5 percent in 1976
and 5 percent in 1977, rates substantially below the
27 percent advance in 1975 and the 23 percent in-
crease in 1974,
fleumKN~ Reflecting an expectation of strong re-
covery, the Administration sees Federal receipts rising
by $43.5 billion in 1976, or 15.4 percent. Receipts
would rise even more with current tax schedules, but
further tax cuts are being proposed. The Revenue
Adjustment Act, which was passed in December 1975,
extended the ongoing provisions of the Tax Reduction
Act of 1975, hut the extension is only through June 30,
1976.~~ The Administration is proposing that taxes be
cut by even more than provided by the Revenue Ad-
justment Act. However, as emphasized in the Presi-
dent’s budget message, these cuts are being proposed
contingent upon favorable action on the expenditure
program.
The tax changes proposed to he effective July 1,
1976 consist of the following: (1) an increase in the
personal exemption from $750 to $1000; (2) substitu-
tion of a flat $2500 standard deduction for the current
low income allowance and percentage standard de-
duction; (3) a reduction in marginal tax rates for
the individual income tax; (4) a reduction in the
maximum corporate tax rate from 48 to 46 percent;
and (5) legislation to provide tax relief to electric
utilities.~~ Also, the Administration proposes that the
increase in the investment tax credit under the Reve-
nue Adjustment Act be made permanent. The only
tax increase for 1976, which is the result of past
legislation, is an increase in the base for social security
contributions from $14,100 to $15,300 effective January
1, 1976.
14
Most of the provisions (the major exception was the tax
rebate) of the Tax Reduction Act were extended, although
there were some changes. In particular, with respect to the
individual income tax, the minimum standard deduction was
raised and the tax credit per exemption was increased.
15
There are several other proposed tax changes with a total
revenue impact of about $1 billion on an annual rate basis:
(1) a tax credit to encourage financial institutions to hold
residential mortgages, (2) accelerated depreciation on plant
and equipment investment in areas of high unemployment,
(3) tax deferral for funds invested in stock purchase plans.
Table VI
PLANNEfl CHANGES IN FEDERAL (NIA) BUDGET
1975 TO 1976
(Bo Icons of DollorsJ
I-HA Rec ipt $43 5
Change Due to Growth 46 6
Change Due to Cycle 4 7
Orange I)veto Tax Rate
Adiustments 71
NIA E pendaures 33 7
bongo in Defense 4 4
Change In Nondefense 29.3
Due to Cycle 1 3
Due to Existgng Programs and
8ev, In t,otive 30.6
MA Surplus or Defi it P 8
frtgh-Emplayonoent Receipts 38,8
High- mptoyment Expenditures 3$ 0
HIgh Employment Surp us or Deficit 3.8
Table \ I shows that tax rate changes. as proposed
by the Administration or due to past legislation,
amount to about $7.8 billion in calendar 1976. This
estimate reflects the dollar amount of tax changes
relative to the rate structure that was in effect, on
average, in 1975. Consequently, the $7.8 bfflion
amount includes not only Administration proposals
but the delayed effects of the Tax Reduction Act
(for example, the tax credit per exemption) and the
increase in the social security tax base on January 1,
1976.
Because of the forecast
of strong economic activity and the proposed slowing
in expenditure grosvth, the NIA deficit is expected to
be reduced. The $9.8 billion decline in the NIA defi-
cit (a decline in the deficit is shown as a positive
number in Table VI) reflects a movement in the
deficit from $74.2 billion in calendar 1975 to $64.4
billion in 1976. The effect of the overall budget pro-
gram on the deficit becomes more substantial by 1977.
Given the budget program and the assumptions about
economic activity, the NIA deficit is projected to de-
cline to $30.7 billion in calendar 1977.
With the budget being influenced in considerable
measure by the strong recovery, the movement in the
NIA budget gives a misleading picture of the extent
of fiscal restraint. The high-employment budget ad-
justs the NIA budget for these feedbacks of economic
activity on the surplus or deficit, As a result, as indi-
cated by the $3.8 billion reduction in the high-em-
ployment deficit, (see Table VI), the economic impact
of the budget program in 1976 is one of slight re-
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straint. The budget program is scheduled to show
significant restraint in calendar 1977 when it is pro-
jected to move to a $16 billion surplus, or a swing of
$25 billion toward restraint.
The CEA does not make a spe-
cific recommendation for monetary policy in 1976, but
suggests some guidelines along with acceptance, in
principle, of the Federal Reserve’s target ranges for
monetary aggregates.
It is not possible to say with any assurance what
growth rates of money are necessary to allow real
GNP to grow by 6 - 6½ percent from 1975 to 1976.
Setting an upper limit on the growth rate, however,
should reduce the prospects for a rekindling of infla-
tion. At the same time, the lower limit provides as-
surance of continued growth in the money supply if
the recovery should turn out to be much weaker than
expected.’°
As general guidelines for future years, the CEA
provides what appears to be a mixed view. On the
one hand, they say “the targets must be administered
with flexibility,” hut, on the other hand, they state
that “what is called for ,.. is a steadier course in
macroeconomic policies than has been followed in the
past”°TReconciliation of these two statements seems
to imply a compromise between a monetary rule and
fully discretionary policy. The CEA does get very
specific, however, in stressing the dangers of moving
to the top of the target range:
concern with the achievement of greater eco-
nomic stability in future sears suggests that any rate
of growth in money which is at the upper limit of the
tolerance range announced by the Federal Reserve
(71
7i percent for M1, 10½ percent for NI,), could not
he maintained indefinitely if progress toward lower
inflation rates is to continue,’8
1/ C
The two primary objectives of the Administration’s
program are long-run in scope. The first objective is
promoting a moderate and sustainable recovery, and
the second is checking the expanding role of Govern-
inent. Although it runs against Keynesian economic
doctrine the Administration feels that these two ob-
jectives are compatible with one another. These two
objectives provide the basis for an evaluation of the
Administration’s economic program over the six-year
horizon, 1976-81.
161976 CEA Report, p. 39.
l7Ibid pp. 21, 39.
‘~Ibid.,pp. 21-22.
CS •7 CS a.i..~ •a a SEC .15.67 (.16.
With the U.S. economy in an apparently strong state
of recovery, the CEA is concerned with keeping it
going, and keeping it going for a long period of time.
The desirability of a sustainable expansion is indis-
putable, but two questions present themselves: (1)
is the Administration’s growth path for GNP con-
sistent with the policies they propose, and (2) given
the GNP growth path, is the price-output scenario
likely?
The Administration has presented projections of GNP
showing an average annual rate of growth of 12.2
percent from 1975 to 1979, followed by a 10 percent
average rate of increase in 1980 and 1981 (see the
first column in Table VII). Along with this projection,
a set of budget estimates are given — estimates based
on the assumption that real Government services will
he maintained at levels implied in the fiscal 1977
budget. In other words, the budget estimates do not
represent a projection of prospective fiscal actions but
show only an extrapolation of “current services.” For
this reason, the budget projections should not be in-
terpreted as a set of fiscal actions designed to achieve
the assumed path for GNP.
To gain possible insight into the means of achieving
GNP growth of 12 percent through 1979, it is inter-
esting to develop conjectures about the course of
monetary actions. The Administration provides no
information about the pattern of monetary action that
they view as necessary to attain their CNP target. The
closest they come to committing themselves on this
question is their concern about the inflationary poten-
tial of sustaining a rate of M, growth at the top of the
Federal Reserve’s target range, that is, at 7.5 percent.
Quite clearly then, a monetary growth rate of less
than 7.5 percent underlies their long-term GNP
projection.
Consider the implications of assuming that money
grows at a steady 6 percent growth rate through 1981
(shown as Alternative A in Table VII). Given the
Administration’s GNP growth path, velocity would
have to increase at a 6 percent average annual rate
from 1975 to 1979 and a4percent rate in 1980 and
1981. Is such a pattern of velocity growth consistent
with historical experience?
Examination of rates of change of velocity for the
postwar period from 1947 to 1975 reveals that the
highest 4-year growth of velocity is 7.4 percent, which
occurred from 1947 to 1951. The second highest period
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Tqbt VII
MON V, VELOCITY AND TI-fE
ADMINISTRATION $ GM’ PROJECTIONS
fAnnual Rote gsf Change)




ected A turned bnplced Growth Assumed tmplied Growth
GNP Growth Money Growth Velocity Growth from 0975 Velgcsty Growth Money C owth from 1975
1976 12.4% 54% 64% 6~4% 50% 70% 70%
1977 122 6J3 59 4.) 40 79 75
1978 12.4 60 60 &1 30 9 8.0
1979 119 60 55 6,0 3.0 84 82
1980 109 £0 4,7 57 30 7-7 80
198i 91 60 33 52 3.0 60 77
Tb dmsru, soudoes at rnvd etalahemn an vne~ am so cmii he o IT tealt t w,
pa byOn Ba Iten s rime d o~ nMon ( I tTØpecn mlvi ,a ho Os lot bun I
b to, Adxnxn rato GN~ p-ojeton t as Bi n anon aeel ion ci st foilowd a to us eat rend
at and bow tbelnony (Sb pthunpc byth Adu-si tsocr rjecto
for velocity growth (which overlaps the 1947-57 pe- ply a sustained change in the rate of change of
nod) is 1949 to 1953 when it grew at a 5.3 percent velocity. For velocity growth to step up and be main-
average rate. Once we move away from these war- tamed at 6 percent suggests the continuing rapid
related periods the highest rate of growth is 3.9 per- development of financial innovations into the future.
cent from 1958 to 1962. Indeed, such changes are occurring all the time, and
-. the observed rise in velocity in the postwar period Another way of analyzing the GNP projection is to
-.. - attests to the effects of such changes. Pointing to re- assume a path of velocity consistent with past experi-
-. cent factors tending to increase velocity, however,
ence, and calculate the implied money path. The re-
-. . . does not imply that such factors will produce a sus- sult of such a calculation is shown as Alternative Bi n .-
tamed change in the rate of velocity growth.
Table VII, and shows money gi-owth of 8.2 percent
from 1975 to 1981. Whether we focus on the 4-year Cf !~rirc1_Oa(pist Sermsias— Despite the
period from 1975 to 1979 or the full 6-year period, the questionable possibility of achieving an average
implied rate of money growth moves above the high growth of GNP of 12 percent over the next four years,
end of the Federal Reserve’s target range. it is still of interest to examine the distribution of
Historical experience does not provide an immu- such growth between price and output change. The
table law, hut one is forced to question a set of pro- Administration’s long-term projections show a 6 per-
jections that is so much at variance with historical cent average rate of real growth from 1975 through
experience. Does the CEA provide any explanation 1981 (see Table VIII). Furthermore, this rapid ad-
for this newly evolving phenomenon? vance of output is accompanied by a slowing of infla-
tion from 6.5 percent in 1975 to 4 percent by 1981.
Although not directed at the long-term projections,
the CEA does devote a section to the discussion of Table VIII provides a summary of the postwar
recent trends in velocity.iO Listed are a set of factors period showing the growth of output and associated
that have recently come into play tending to increase changes in the inflation rate. First of all, there is no
velocity via downward shifts in the demand for period of sustained expansion as long and strong as
money. Included are references to recent financial the one projected by the Administration. Second,
innovations and changing regulations relating to tele- there is only one of the four periods of six-year ceo-
phonic transfer of funds and corporate holdings of uoonic expansion that inflation decelerated — the
saving accounts at commercial banks. Geteris paribus, 1955 to 1961 period, which was one of real growth
there is little question that these innovations increase below trend. In general, the more rapid the rate of
velocity. The relevant point for the long-run projec- real growth the greater the acceleration of inflation.
tions, however, is whether these financial changes im- It is difficult to dra\v any definite conclusions with
________ the sketchy data available, but what evidence there
i9jbid., pp. 35-39. is suggests that 6 percent growth of output over a
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In summary, the prospects for sustained economic
expansion are good, if monetary growth is held steady
— a point which is emphasized by the CEA in their
Report. But the growth of GNP is not likely to be as
rapid as they indicate unless the rate of monetary
expansion is accelerated. Furthermore, even if their
path of GNP growth is achieved, there is some evi-
dence from past experience questioning the likelihood
of sustaining a rapid growth in output without ac-
celerating the rate of inflation, The latter conclusion
is grounded on a weaker foundation, however, be-
cause the current situation appears to be unique rela-
tive to past experience because of relatively large
excess capacity, But when account is taken of the
effect of Government regulations relating to product
reliability, occupational and consumer safety, and en-
vironmental control, the amount of excess capacity
currently is much less than a superficial reading of the
numbers would suggest.
C/reeking the Growth of hederot Spending
The second major objective of the Administration’s
program is checking the growth of Federal spending.





they will not be discussed here. Of concern are the
implications of such a goal for the course of the
economy in future years.
The CEA offers a challenge to conventional macro-
economics, Virtually all of the well-known econome-
tric models suggest that increased Government spend-
ing is stimulative, but this is a feature which applies
to the short run.2i In particular, when the economy
is operating below some so-called full employment
level, an increase in Government spending stimulates
output and employment, and once full employment is
reached, any further increases in Federal spending
puts upward pressures on prices. This is the message
of Keynesian economics.
The Administration questions the assumption that
the Federal government can promote economic ex-
pansion for a very long period. The focus in the Re-
port is on the detrimental effects of rapidly rising
Government spending on economic growth. The
budget program is grounded on the hypothesis that
the grosvth of productive potential will be greater if
the size of the Government sector is reduced relative
to the private sector.
The financing of Government programs has to come
ultimately from incomes and profits generated by the
private sector, If the growth of Government is allowed
to continue unchecked, financing requirements will
2t
See Caoy Fromm and Lawrence Klein, “A Comparison of
Eleven Econometric Models of the United States,” Ameri-
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more complete analysis of the price-output scenario should
probably also take the growth of money into consideration.
Research at this Bank indicates that a maintained growth in
money of 6 percent would produce an inflation rate of be-
tween 5 and 6 percent by 1981. See Leonall C. .Andersen
and Denis S. Karnosky, “The Appropriate Time Frame for
Controlling Monetary- Aggregates: The St. Louis Evidence,”
Controlling Monetary Aggregates 11: The Implementation
(Proceedings of a Conference Held at Melvin Village, New
Hampshire, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, September 1972), pp. 147-177.
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eventually work toward discouragement of incentives
to work, produce and invest.22 These are the ingre-
clients that are vital to the growth process.
Even though the CEA does not develop statistical
evidence in support of their position, their proposal
is a refreshing one because it reflects a long-run per-
spective that has long been missing from the policy-
making process. Recognition of short vs. long-run ef-
fects of expanding Government programs represents
a significant departuo-e from conventional thinking,
which has been dominated by considerations of the
short-run transitory effect of fiscal actions on economic
activity.
The Administration is in the position of being able
to take a long-run perspective now that the recovery
seems to be well underway. As a result, they have
formulated a budget program that, if enacted, would
reverse the trend of Government spending. Further-
more, such a reversal of trend is regarded by the
Administration as being consistent with promoting a
moderate and sustainable recovery.
The CEA forecasts for 1976 and 1977 are at the
high end of the range of the consensus forecasts,
indicating a relatively rapid advance of output and
continuing inflation in the range of 5 to 6 percent.
The scenario for the years following 1977 is somewhat
of a mystery, however, as the CEA does not spell out
its policy strategy. Furthermore, it is not clear how
output could continue to advance rapidly and infla-
tion could abate at the same time.
22
For some discussion of this hypothesis, see Keith M. Carlson
and Roger W. Spencer, “Cro’vding Out and Its Critics,”
this Review (December 1975), p. 16.
Evidence was presented indicating that the Admin-
istration’s long-run GNP path is rather unlikely, given
past relationships. In particular, even if a relatively
rapid 6 percent rate of monetary expansion were as-
suoned, the implied pattern of velocity change in the
Administration’s projections is so far from historical
experience that it is difficult to accept. No evidence
is developed in the CEA Report supporting a marked
and sustained change in the rate of change of velocity.
One of the most interesting aspects of the Report is
the recommendation for slowing the growth of Fed-
eral spending, and that the long-term interest of the
economy will be best served by such a slowing. De-
spite the significance of the recommendation, the
rhetoric is not backed by any quantitative evidence.
The proposal is laudable, however, because the focus
is shifted from short-mn aggregate demand considera-
tions to long-mn effects on aggregate supply.
Contrary to many of the past CEA reports, short-
run problems do not seem to he paramount. it is true
that the ultimate economic goals have not been
achieved nor is it likely that they will be reached in
the next year or two. Yet, the foundation for their
ultimate achievement rests on the development of
policies that aim for steadiness in monetary growth
and reducing the size of Government. Polic’.’makers
and the public seem to have accepted the fact that
achievement of full employment with price stability
is not possible within a short period of time, and any
attempt to do so is self-defeating. Consequently, the
time is ripe to take a long-run perspective and at-
tempt to define a long-term policy strategy. The Ad-
ministration has succeeded in shifting the emphasis,
hut the details of the scenario still need to be spelled
out.
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